搜索结果: 1-15 共查到“理论经济学 auctions”相关记录21条 . 查询时间(0.062 秒)
When Should Sellers Use Auctions?
Auctions Entry Selection Mechanism Design Mergers and Acquisitions
2015/9/24
A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously orsequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants’ decisions. The re...
Why do we observe overbidding in first
price private value auctions? This paper aims
to answer this question, which has been extensively
studied in the literature, from a nonstandard
point of view...
Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions
Neural Circuitry Economic Auctions
2015/9/23
We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling
economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fM...
Losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret. In third price auctions if bidders anticipate
loser regret, then in line with the experimental findings, in a symmetric equilibrium t...
Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
Clock auctions Pricing rules Market design Experiments
2015/9/23
We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock
auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and
lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winn...
In auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it, revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price aucti...
Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auctions
financial crisis uniform-price auction clock auction
2015/9/23
We report the results of an experimental test of alternative auction designs suitable for pricing
and removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets as part of the financial rescue
planned by t...
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids,with an Application to Real Estate Auctions
Minimum Acceptable Bids Real Estate Auctions
2015/9/23
In a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations and endogenous entry, we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes, and derive a lower bound on the op...
Tariffying Auctions
Tariffying Auctions
2015/9/23
A strategy to convert quotas to tariffs is to auction the quota rights and use the realized auction prices as guides to setting tariffs. In the 1980's, New Zealand employed auctions to allocate quota ...
Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in
rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes.
The purpo...
Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Brings No Solace to Auction Experts
Medicare Auctions Brings Auction Experts
2015/9/18
Our Economists’ Voice column sumthe current and proposed Medicare auctions. The column was based on a careful
reading and analysis of the auction rules.
Randomization,Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments:The Role of Cash Balances in Private Value Auctions
Randomization Endogeneity Laboratory Experiments Cash Balances Private Value Auctions
2015/9/18
From a theoretical perspective, cash balances are thought to play a role in common value auctions because of limited liability. However, they have also been found to be important in common value aucti...
In a two-stage auction women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men,bidding more aggressively than the men in both phases of the auction process.
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
Radio Spectrum Reallocation Deferred-Acceptance Auctions
2015/7/21
Deferred-acceptance auctions choose allocations by an iterative
process of rejecting the least attractive bid. These auctions have
distinctive computational and incentive properties that make them
...
IDENTIFICATION IN ASCENDING AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC CORRELATED PRIVATE VALUES
ASYMMETRIC CORRELATED PRIVATE VALUES SCENDING AUCTIONS
2015/7/21
We present a nonparametric approach to identi cation in ascending
auctions when bidders may be asymmetric and have correlated private values. Our
approach builds on and generalizes that of Aradillas...